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Abstract.
It is crucial for content providers (CPs) to appear prominently on dominant online
platforms in order to attract consumer demand. Apart from organic search results,
content providers can obtain such prominence also in return for a monetary
payment to the platform, e.g., in the form of sponsored search results. In this
article, we investigate some of the economic consequences, if such payment can
also be made with consumers’ data instead of money. Since data is non-rivalrous,
the economic effects of data sharing for prominence are more complex and differ
from paying for prominence. In a game-theoretic model we show that more
consumer data will be collected as soon as CPs can obtain prominence on the
platform. Whether the platform is more biased under a prominence-for-money
scheme or under a prominence-for-data scheme depends on the marginal value
of shared (non-exclusive) data. If this value is high, prominence-for-data will
yield a higher platform bias, lead to more data collection by the CPs, and
ultimately lower consumer surplus. Our results therefore bear important insights
for the regulation of data-rich online platforms.
Keywords: B2B data sharing, prominence on platforms, consumer data, data
collection
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Introduction

The European Commission recognizes online platforms as the “key gatekeepers of the
internet” (European Commission, 2017, p. 7). For instance, 82% of small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) state in a survey realized by the European Commission that they
are reliant on search engines in order to favor their offered services and products
(European Commission, 2017). The main purpose of online platforms is to organize
and present the available content in a way that facilitates the consumers' discovery
process for content (Krämer & Schnurr, 2018; Renda, 2015). However, this also implies
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that online platforms have the ability to steer consumers towards a specific content
provider (CP) by giving that CP more prominence on the platform. Prominence is
commonly granted in return for monetary payments to the platform (e.g., sponsored
search results), usually elicited in the course of a position auction. However, platforms
have also been accused to extract data from CPs (e.g., on consumer behavior), which
helps them to optimize their business and to increase their data-induced market power.
Often platforms induce CPs to share some of their data by offering them benefits on the
platform or through access to some additional services (e.g., a social login or fulfillment
service). In this paper, we specifically consider the scenario where a CP is offered more
prominence on the platform (e.g. by biasing the search results in favor of that CP) in
return for access to the CP's data.
This scenario is exemplified by Google’s accelerated mobile pages (AMP) project,
whose main purpose is to speed up mobile websites by hosting the content directly on
Google’s services. However, this also has the (likely intended) effect that Google is
able to attain the usage statistics of unaffiliated websites that are accessed via AMP. In
return, AMP-enabled websites are placed more prominently in the mobile search
results, e.g. by showing in the so-called carousel results or simply be being listed higher
in the mobile search results page (because they load faster). Thus, in effect, AMP is a
means to implement data for prominence (Jun et al., 2019).
This relatively new phenomenon of business-to-business (B2B) data sharing as an
alternative currency for CPs to gain prominence on online platforms has not been
considered in the economic literature so far, despite its practical and political relevance.
B2B data sharing reveals certain characteristics and implications which differ strongly
from monetary payment. Most importantly, data is non-rivalrous which means that it
can be duplicated effortlessly. This implies that the welfare effects of payments in data
are far more complex since welfare is not simply shifted from the sender to the recipient
of the payment.

2

Related literature

We contribute to the emerging literature on digital platform ecosystems, which is
reviewed more generally by De Reuver et al. (2018) as well as Hein et al. (2020). More
specifically, we consider how the value generated by data is distributed between the
platform and the complementors (see Tiwana (2015)) for a review. Our paper especially
contributes to two literature branches – payment for prominence and data-driven
markets.
First, payment for prominence on online platforms has previously been considered in
various contexts – i.e. usability, welfare effects and policy regulations. Receiving
prominence on platforms is crucial for content providers to obtain consumer demand
(Krämer & Zierke, 2020). For instance, Ursu (2018) shows that a higher ranking and
thus, more prominence significantly increases the consumers’ click through rates.
Krämer and Schnurr (2018) review the literature concerning both the strategic and the

welfare effects of paying for prominence in order to investigate whether there is a need
for a platform neutrality regulation. On the one hand, if CPs compete in prices,
sponsored search on rankings results in increased prices and thus, a lower consumer
surplus. Although the platform’s and the CPs’ profits increases, the CPs may end up in
a prisoners' dilemma and hence, the total welfare is likely to be smaller under payment
for prominence (Armstrong & Zhou, 2011; Zhou, 2011). On the other hand, if CPs
compete in qualities, content providers which offer a higher quality also have an higher
willingness-to-pay for prominence on the platform and hence, prominence serves as
signals for the CPs’ content quality and increases the consumer surplus and the total
welfare (Athey & Ellison, 2011; Chen & He, 2011; de Cornière & Taylor, 2020; Krämer
and Zierke, 2020). Therefore, consumers are not necessarily worse off under a
prominence for data scheme. In particular, De Cornière and Taylor (2019) study the
effects of biased intermediation for a, with the platform, integrated CP. Depending on
whether the seller’s and the consumers’ payoffs are conflicting or congruent, a bias can
be beneficial for consumers.
Second, several theoretical papers model competition in data-driven markets. For
instance, Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) analyze under which conditions duopolies are
stable and when monopolies emerge in data-driven markets. De Cornière and Taylor
(2020) examine under which conditions a firm with a better (worse) data set generates
more (less) consumer utility in data-driven mergers or consumers privacy concerns
regarding data disclosure. Gu et al. (2019) as well as Ichihashi (2019) model
competition of data intermediaries explicitly. One of their main findings is that the
economic profits of a firm are the greater, the more data is exclusively available to that
firm. We built on their results and take these findings as input for our model. De
Cornière and de Nijs (2016) analyze the impact of disclosing consumer information on
product prices. In their model an online platform decides whether to give advertisers
access to the platform’s consumer information prior bidding on the platform’s
advertising slots but before learning the consumers’ information. While there is a
burgeoning literature on digital platforms, payment-for-prominence, and data-driven
markets, respectively, to the best of our knowledge, the economic impacts of
prominence-for-data schemes have not been studied in the literature so far.
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Model

We develop a game-theoretic model in order to analyze the economic implications of
data-for-prominence schemes in the platform economy. In our model, a monopolistic
platform can decide to offer one of two CPs more prominence on the platform (e.g., by
biasing the search results) in return for a share of the CP’s data. The platform can steer
consumers to one of the two CPs by giving it prominence on the platform, e.g., by
ranking it systematically higher in the search results everything else being equal. In this
case, we will say that the platform has a 'bias'.
Both CPs compete for the consumers’ attention, and they offer their content for free,
but collect data from the users that consume their content.

The consumers single-home and after entering the platform, they choose which of the
two CPs they want to visit. The consumer demand of each CP depends on three main
factors. Everything else being equal, consumers prefer the CP which (1) collects less
data about them, and (2) which offers content that is closer to the consumer's individual
preference; but (3) the CP's demand depends also on the platform's bias.
Moreover, the CPs compete with the platform on the data market (e.g., the market for
targeted advertising, selling data analytics services or simply as a data broker) in which
they can exploit the consumer data acquired by offering their consumer-facing service.
While we abstract from modelling competition in the data market explicitly, we borrow
the central insight from explicit models of competition data intermediaries (Gu et al.,
2019; Ichihashi, 2019) that the economic profits of a firm are the greater, the more of
the firm's data is exclusively available to that firm. The platform and the CPs can reap
higher profits in the data market, the more user data they possess. However, due to the
non-rivalry of data, competition in the data market intensifies as more firms possess the
same data sets. This enables us to examine the trade-offs the CPs face when sharing
data in return for prominence, what impact the substitutability of the acquired data has
on data sharing and the welfare effects.
We compare three scenarios. First, a baseline scenario where the platform can choose
to bias the presentation in favor of one of the CPs, but does not receive a compensation
in money or data in return. Second, a prominence-for-data scheme, where the platform
offers to bias the presentation in favor of one CP in return for a share of that CP’s data.
Third, a counterfactual prominence-for-money scheme, where the platform offers to
bias the presentation in return for a financial payment, but where the platform does not
receive additional data from the CP.
We analyze the scenarios by backwards induction in order to determine the subgameperfect equilibria. Thereby, the timing is as follows: In Stage 1, the platform chooses a
prominence offer by selecting a level of bias and, depending on the scenario, a
compensation in terms of data or money. In Stage 2, the CPs decide whether to accept
the prominence offer. In Stage 3, the CPs choose their data collection level, and in Stage
4, the consumers decide which CP to access and demands are realized.
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Findings

We find that the platform has no incentive to bias the presentation in favor of one CP,
if it does not receive a compensation in return. An unbiased platform maintains the
highest possible level of competition for consumers between the CPs, and induces the
CPs to limit the amount of data that they collect from consumers. On the one hand, this
is good for the platform itself, especially if the platform has already access to large
consumer data sets, because it avoids that CPs can collect more data on consumers
themselves, which would lower the average value of the platform's data set. On the
other hand, an unbiased platform also preserves consumers' privacy in the best possible
way, and avoids that some consumers may be steered away from the content that would

offer them the highest utility. Therefore, an unbiased platform always provides the
highest possible consumer surplus.
Introducing a bias would weaken the competition between CPs and allow them to
collect more data from consumers. This in turn, intensifies the competition with the
platform on the data market.
However, we can also show that if the platform can be compensated for giving
prominence to a CP, either through a prominence-for-money or prominence-for-data
scheme, then this provides the platform with additional incentives to introduce a bias.
The bias can either be higher under a prominence-for-money scheme or a prominencefor-data scheme, depending in the marginal value of non-exclusive data.
If the value of shared (non-exclusive) data is low, the platform has a larger incentive to
bias under a prominence-for-money scheme, and will also make larger profits under
this scheme. However, if the marginal value of shared data is high, then a prominencefor-data scheme leads to a higher platform bias, and a higher platform profit. However,
for consumers a larger platform bias is always welfare decreasing, because it weakens
the competition between CPs, and leads to collection of more data, and hence higher
privacy costs for consumers.
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